RIM Report 2012/2013

Information & discussion on the Rhino Poaching Pandemic
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Toko
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Re: Rhino Issue Manager Final Report 2012

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8.2.1 Domestic Moratorium
The National Moratorium on Domestic Trade in Rhino horn in South Africa was implemented in 2009 and resulted in a complete ban on all domestic trade in rhino horn. There are increasing calls for the moratorium to be lifted. Those in favour of lifting the ban include the Private Rhino Owners Association (PROA) and other representatives of the private sector, as well as members of the public sector reserves. They argue that permission to sell horn in the domestic market, while it will not lead to reductions in poaching, will a) require the development of an online permitting system impervious to corruption, b) restore confidence of private sector owners of rhino c) act as a pilot for the opening of international trade eventually, should this be undertaken and d) result in the fact tracking of chipping, DNA profiling and centralizing of horn stocks, as well as significantly improved control and identification of horn and rhino.
The suggested process is one where the moratorium is lifted but only horn which has been chipped, registered with the central data base and which is attached to a DNA profile, can be traded. This horn would be termed, TOPS REGISTERED. Once the horn has been identified, it is moved to a secure location51 and kept there. Subsequently paper ownership is traded and not the actual horn. The buyer will require a TOPS permit to buy the horn and ownership is registered to that person. Any person owning a horn must be able to prove the legitimate origin of that horn otherwise that person will be prosecuted under TOPS. All transaction will be certified and all horns must have a TOPS permit. This, it is argued, will simultaneously ensure that all State owned and all privately owned horns are DNA profiled and chipped and the State can trade against stockpiles immediately thus improving cash flows for conservation. Auditing horn stocks will also be significantly easier and more accurate. Most of the suggestions are catered for in TOPs currently, but the lifting of the domestic moratorium will require the Minister to repeal the prohibition. A key argument on the part of those in favour of lifting the moratorium is that it has not resulted in a decrease in poaching.
Those against the lifting of the domestic moratorium argue that it will legitimize trade, that it will result in an increase in demand over time and that it will send the wrong signals to the international community.


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Re: Rhino Issue Manager Final Report 2012

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8.3 Impact of Trade Bans
8.3.3 The Case of Rhino

Wild world rhino numbers in 2011 amounted to 28, 195 with African rhino accounting for 25, 050 of this number. 20 170 of these were white rhino and 4 880 are black rhino. In 1895, as a result of extended hunting and poaching activities there were only 50 white rhino left, all in South Africa. This has increased to current numbers as a result of careful conservation and effective protection. In the absence of such strategies, the Northern White Rhino subspecies appears to be extinct. African black rhino numbers declined from over 100 000 in the 1960’s to 2 400 in 1995 and have doubled since then to stand at 4 880 in 2011 (Emslie, 2012).
According to Emslie and Brooks (1999) and Milliken and Shaw (2012) trade in rhino horn medicines is continuing despite an almost world-wide ban on commercial international and internal trade. CITES trade bans have not succeeded in halting the rhino horn trade and the huge reduction in black rhino populations has occurred even though it is included in Appendix I, indicating that that international trade bans alone have been not been effective. Trade bans have facilitated the development of a black market for rhino horn, and encouraged the entry of illegal traders and poachers as demand, and prices, increase faster than supply. Although CITES has implemented increasingly tough measures since the first ban on Rhino trade in 1977 none of these measures has led to a reduction in the poaching of rhino horn or a reduction in illegal trade. Demand for the horn is grounded in cultural beliefs and mores and has increased as consumers have become wealthier (Lockwood, 2012).
The CITES trade ban in rhino horn was put in place to ensure the preservation and growth of the species. It is based on the assumptions that a) the rendering of trade in horn illegal will in and of itself reduce the motivation to trade and b) that the threat posed 35 years ago is of the same intensity and danger as the threat today. Conrad (2012) submits that policy makers were of the view then that restrictions on trade were the best policy response to commercial threats to the survival of threatened species. The CITES mechanism for limiting and prohibiting trade assumes that when a species is no longer legally tradable people will stop buying it or will switch to another commodity (Fischer, 2003). It is also assumed that consumers willing to take the risk of buying from the black market will be put off by high prices or certain and severe penalties.
However, the power of international syndicates and the capacity of developing nations to fight back against poaching have clearly demonstrated with Rhino that a trade ban will not stop determined criminals, and that increasingly sophisticated and expensive protection is required. The costs of protection and the costs of managing down demand in consumer nations is not affordable for many developing nations and a different solution is required. The CITES prohibition on trade, combined with increasing demand could have the perverse effect of further reducing wild populations instead of protecting them.


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Re: Rhino Issue Manager Final Report 2012

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9. Sustainable Use Model
Sustainable use is defined in various ways. One definition suggests that sustainable use means “using rhino assets in such a manner so as to economically sustain the populations as a result of either covering all costs associated with this and/or making profits related to rhino assets”. Another defines sustainable use as “the use of a biological resource in a way and at a rate that would not lead to the long-term decline, would not disrupt the ecological integrity of the ecosystem in which it occurs, and would ensure its continued use to meet the needs and aspirations of present and future generations of people”. Regardless of how it is precisely defined, the notion of sustainable use has become increasingly important in the face of major increases in costs of conservation in many states and in South Africa (Emslie & Brooks, 1999; Child, 2012; Draper, 2012).
Noting that global trade dynamics have changed but conservation models have not kept pace, Child (2012) argues for a “maximisation of the benefits of wildlife for the people on whose land the wildlife lives”. The SU model rests on four pillars, proprietorship (rights to use, sell and manage), price (humane commercial value of wildlife) subsidiarity (effectivemanagement of scale and hierarchy in institutions) and collaborative adaptive management (adaptation to change and complexity through collaborative processes). The current global philosophy of conservation strategy, based on prohibition/regulation of trade (CITES) and conservation centralised in the hands of the State, should adapt along with changed external circumstances. Trade is an intrinsic part of the new mode of conservation. Child (2012) states that the current model emphasises national and international public interest in preventing rhino poaching, but imposes restrictions on use, thus shifting the costs of these preservationist policies to rhino owners and producers. There is no financial contribution made to the owners and producers for the costs of protection against poaching and no direct contribution in this regard is made to States by CITES or to private owners by States. Child is supported by Draper (2012) who suggests that the world should pay South Africa to protect the rhino and calls for “a fairer future that shares the burden of world heritage custodianship”.
Conrad (2012) uses the term “perfect storm” to table the notion that a concatenation of circumstances, not individual problematic, can have lethal results if they co-occur. In this view, these circumstances already exist, and hence there is danger that this will result in the extinction of the rhino as a species. While trade bans can work in the short term she argues, if perpetuated beyond their utility and in “perfect storm” circumstances they can have the reverse outcome to what was intended. The conditions for the “perfect storm”, all of which are currently present in the case of rhino are:
 Price insensitive buyers in the market
 High commercial value
 Development of trade, legal and illegal
 Public ownership reduces incentive to protect
 Conflict for resources with humans
 Inadequate enforcement of trade bans
Eco tourism offers job creation to rural communities in rhino management and in related tourism services and products. The hunting of surplus rhino results in improved herd and population management and revenue generation. Live sales offer the same benefits. The sale of rhino horn from natural deaths and stockpiles is a part of sustainable use and generates much needed revenues for conservation. As poaching increases, options for sustainable use decrease. Illegal hunting reduces the number of rhino available for legitimate hunters, changes the population profile, increases the costs of conservation and interferes significantly with conservation goals and objectives.


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Re: Rhino Issue Manager Final Report 2012

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10. RIM comment
In order to be permitted to trade, under normal circumstance, South Africa would apply to the CITES COP which will occur in 2016. However, there is provision for such application in between COPs in Article 27, Section 2. The preparation of an application will require extensive range state lobbying, education for EU countries which tend to vote as a bloc, a strategic communications campaign and other political and practical activities. RIM recommends the re-establishment of legitimate trade in rhino horn and the preparation of an immediate application (18 months to prepare) based on:
 Banning trade in horn has not reduced poaching in the face of increased demand;
 Because rhino do not need to die for the horn to be harvested, if rhino farming is incentivised through the usual market price mechanisms, fewer rhino will die, and a sustainable economic activity which will benefit many South Africans and the South African economy, can be implemented;
 State owned horn can be sold to improve wild rhino protection, and to contribute to conservation budgets;
 South Africa should control all sales using an appropriate model and protecting against predatory buying tactics;
 South Africa should use as part of its application to CITES and as part of its lobbying process, the first econometric “Rhinonomics” model;
 South Africa should remove the moratorium on domestic trade. All traded horn must be registered, chipped and DNA profiled before a TOPS REGISTRATION certificate will be issued. Once the horn has been sold once, it moves to a secure facility and thereafter only the paper will be traded;
 Demand side management strategies should be agreed with consuming nations.
In the shorter term, protection activities should be improved and prioritised according to Key and Important population ratings. A central rhino unit should be supported with key and important population based distribution nationally.
All black rhino and all key and important white rhino populations should be subject to a dehorning programme with immediate effect and as many other rhino populations should be dehorned as can be afforded. This is extremely costly but this exercise will demonstrate South African commitment to the preservation of the species. The horn stub will still have value and therefore poaching will still occur but to a lesser extent. Rhino do not need their horns for social, biological or protective reasons.


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Re: Rhino Issue Manager Final Report 2012

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11. Summary Findings of Rhinonomics Econometric Model
There are no econometric models on the supply/demand dynamics of rhino horn trade which would assist in informing the debate on the likely outcomes of various trade options. For this reason, the RIM commissioned the development of an econometric model to begin the process of scenario building and evaluation on the matter of trade. Even though full data on demand and price are not readily available, even by proxy, the model is able to assess “what if” for various possible data and allows us to assess the impact of various decisions at various levels of impact. Over time, as more accurate data become available on price and demand levels, the model’s ability to predict outcomes will become more precise and stable.
There are a number of factors that are relevant to the understanding of the rhino market that should be noted at the outset. There is a market for rhino products. This is implicitly or explicitly acknowledged by all parties to the debate, and has a number of implications.
 The fact that this market is – for the most part - illegal under CITES does not mean that it does not exist. Clearly, declaring the trade in rhino products “illegal” has not closed the market down.
 An illegal market may have some unique characteristics, but dynamically it still behaves in much the same way as a legal one. A product’s illegal status does not negate the laws of supply and demand. It does, however, make it harder to analyse and study a market when the product concerned cannot be legally traded, because the information flows relating to incentives and behaviour are not as easy to determine.
 From the perspective of the participants in the market (suppliers and consumers) there is probably little about rhino products that is innately different from many other products: it can be supplied profitably; and it satisfies particular wants or needs.
A functioning market is, by its very nature, a dynamic entity that is subject to continual change. It is simply not possible to know everything about a market and to be able to predict with certainty how it will respond to different developments. This is as relevant to an illegal market as it is to a legal one. The market for rhino products is closely related to the market for rhinos themselves. Rhinos have value to different stakeholders for different reasons. These can range from the “value” of their role in biodiversity, the net tourism earnings they are able to deliver over their lifetime, the value that can be extracted as a result of their death (whether natural or unnatural), the medicinal effects they supposedly impart to consumers, the potential for profit to different elements of the supply chain of rhino products, and the potential for speculative profits to be earned from both live rhino and rhino products – amongst others. The prices that “consumers” of live rhino and rhino products are prepared to pay are directly linked to their perceived value.
The following conclusions can be drawn from the modeling analysis:
 In the absence of any successful major initiatives or interventions, demand for rhino horn will continue to increase in years to come as a result of income and population growth in the current major consumer markets of China and Vietnam. This will support on-going increases in market prices (possibly to in excess of $100,000/kg by 2017) as well as increases in the number of rhino that are poached each year. It carries the added risk that the increased profitability that the higher prices give rise to will encourage the entry of further criminal syndicates into the market, and the possible expansion of demand into new market areas.
 In order to even begin to reduce the numbers of rhino poached each year, anti-poaching efforts would need to reduce supply by around 33% of current levels – given the natural growth in demand anticipated. However, on their own, the success of such initiatives would serve to continue to push up the price of rhino horn, possibly making it relatively more profitable to supply. There is therefore little likelihood that criminal syndicates will permanently leave the market if this remains the only element of the strategy.
 Effective demand-reduction must be part of a long term strategy if the objective is to reduce the market price and offset the demand growth anticipated as a result of income and population growth. Such efforts may need to target potential new consumer markets as well as existing ones, so as to pre-empt simple displacement. Measures that cause consumers to question the medicinal (and other) effects of rhino horn are likely to be the most effective in the short-to-medium term.
 Legalisation of trade offers the potential of reducing criminal supply and consumption, of displacing illegal supply, and of expanding rhino ranges and populations – provided that legal supply is not accompanied by measures that raise its real cost substantially (as may be implicit in existing CITES trade practices).
 A fixation on avoiding contamination of legal supply with illegal supply is likely to be selfdefeating. It could simply limit the potential to displace illegal supply - resulting in the increased profitability, and perpetuation, of illegal supply in a two tiered market. Legalisation of trade does, however, carry with it built in incentives for suppliers to develop market demand over the longer term, by seeking to identify new markets and uses. The difference is that when the returns on complements in production accrue to the owners of live rhino instead of to criminal syndicates, there is a built in incentive for them to support such demand on a sustainable basis.
The “product” of the criminal syndicates is their supply chain. If it is not used for moving rhino horn, it will almost inevitably be used to move other illegal products (including other wildlife products). The factors that make South Africa (and other African countries) conducive locations for criminal syndicate operation (of which corruption is a significant part) need to be addressed effectively to protect biodiversity on the continent.
Addressing the rhino poaching problem cannot be tackled simplistically. It will require a multi-faceted approach that seeks to curb illegal supply through anti-poaching measures, while simultaneously engaging in effective demand-reduction measures. In this context, legalisation of trade offers the additional potential to reduce the price (and relative attractiveness of the market) to criminal syndicates, displace illegal supply, and promote longer term expansion of the rhino population.


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Re: Rhino Issue Manager Final Report 2012

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11. Annexure One –Notes on Rhino Counting
There has been some debate around the accuracy of rhino counts undertaken in the Kruger National Park. Estimating the number of rhino in such a large area presents some particular difficulties and it is not usually possible to be 100 per cent accurate.
Techniques used to minimise error are strip transects, block counts, distance sampling, dung counts, mark-recapture techniques, call-up surveys, registration studies and total counts (100% coverage of an area) (Ferreira, Botha & Emmett, 2012). A total aerial count (by helicopter) is the most accurate method.
Accuracy is assessed in terms of two measures, bias and precision and there are a number of possible sources of error. First, there may be some animals in the population who are not available to be counted at the time of counting (availability bias), second, the animals may be available but may not be seen to be counted (detectability bias) and thirdly, even if the animals are available and detected, different observers have different abilities to detect (observer bias). These affect the precision (the likely spread of estimates given the uncertainties introduce by the biases) of the count.
Accurate counts are critical for the management of rhino (and other large mammals) in the KNP and sufficient budget will need to be found to permit for an annual helicopter based count to be implemented – at least until the poaching threat abates. The budget per count, assuming that population profiles are included, will be approximately ZAR 3 million per count in 2012 Rands (Fereirra, 2012).


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Mel
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Re: Rhino Issue Manager Final Report 2012

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Toko wrote:8.2.1 Domestic Moratorium
Excuse my lack of imagination - but what would buyers do with the horn
they purchased domestically?


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Re: Rhino Issue Manager Final Report 2012

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Toko wrote:10. RIM comment
All black rhino and all key and important white rhino populations should be subject to a dehorning programme with immediate effect and as many other rhino populations should be dehorned as can be afforded. This is extremely costly but this exercise will demonstrate South African commitment to the preservation of the species. The horn stub will still have value and therefore poaching will still occur but to a lesser extent. Rhino do not need their horns for social, biological or protective reasons.
I can see where they are coming from, but shouldn't the goal be to protect a species in its whole appearance???


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Re: Rhino Issue Manager Final Report 2012

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Mel wrote:
Toko wrote:8.2.1 Domestic Moratorium
Excuse my lack of imagination - but what would buyers do with the horn
they purchased domestically?
-O- Store it, wait for the legalized trade to go and sell at higher prices -O- or find an illegal way to sell it :-?


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Re: Rhino Issue Manager Final Report 2012

Post by Mel »

Why would the actual holder of the horn not want the very same thing
and just keep it and sell it illegally at a higher price or wait for legalized
international trade...


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