Arms probe links Czech guns to Kruger rhino slaughter

[Klipspringer]

A gunrunning network dubbed the Rhino Rifle Syndicate is behind a worldwide plot to equip Kruger National Park poachers with high-powered Czech-made rifles.

An investigation by the Conflict Awareness Project, an international organisation that investigates arms traffickers, has traced how the syndicate helped elevate small-scale rhino poaching to an industrial level.

This is revealed in a shocking report of a four-year investigation headed by Conflict Awareness Project director Kathi Lynn Austin. The report implicates the Mozambican ministry of the interior, and other state authorities there and in SA in rhino poaching.


Download the report here:
https://www.followtheguns.org/follow-th ... report.pdf

*Key Findings
­ New Trends: The types and sources of firearms used by poachers in Kruger National Park and
surrounding wildlife areas have changed over time. Stolen firearms and guns recycled from previous wars
have increasingly given way to newly minted high­caliber hunting rifles. Poachers often outfit these rifles
with silencers to avoid detection by anti­poaching forces. The .375 and .458 are the most commonly used
ammunition calibers.
­ Weapons of Choice: Many of the .375­ and .458­caliber rifles used in rhino poaching trace back to
Mozambique imports during the past decade. While the poaching rifles were manufactured in the Czech
Republic by Česká zbrojovka Uherský Brod (CZUB), some of them bore “CZ­USA Kansas City, KS” roll
marks. The roll marks indicate that CZ­USA—CZUB’s wholly owned American subsidiary—was meant to
import the rifles for sale in the U.S.. Instead, these guns were diverted to Mozambique before they were
moved cross­border to kill rhinos in South Africa.
­ Corruption: High­level corruption and political influence peddling have fueled the proliferation of CZ rifles
in Mozambique and South Africa. Government and law enforcement inaction against the gunrunning
networks is an indicator of corruption in South Africa and Mozambique.
­ Power Dynamics: The TCO and its poaching bosses initially controlled the sourcing and distribution of
CZ rifles, guaranteeing direct shares of the profits. This changed in 2016 as the criminal enterprise became
more diffused. Poaching teams and syndicates began to break off to form splinter groups, expanding
poaching to outlying areas previously less­impacted by the scourge.
­ The Arms Pipeline: The tracking and tracing of weapons and ammunition through each phase of the
supply chain—from their foreign manufacture and export to their local importation, sale, and distribution—is
a valuable method of collecting forensic evidence and implicating top­level players and foreign actors within
the wildlife crime syndicates. Authorities need to systematically collect data and analyze trends associated
with firearms used in wildlife crimes. These are important crime­fighting and anti­poaching tools that law
enforcement and conservation organizations have overlooked for far too long.
­ Deterrents: The threat of criminal prosecution and asset forfeiture are two of the most powerful
instruments governments have to deter high­level criminals within the wildlife trafficking syndicates. The
evidence dossiers compiled on the Rhino Rifle Syndicate should be prioritized by law enforcement in the five
countries where the network operates with the aim of building criminal cases that lead to arrests and
prosecutions when warranted. The goal of criminal prosecutions is accountability and ultimately deterrence
of future crimes.
­ Arms Race: Conflicts between poaching and anti­poaching forces will continue to escalate unless more
attention is paid to the source of firearms used by wildlife crime syndicates. The poaching war has already
claimed over a thousand lives and led to extra­judicial killings, torture, and the alleged planting of crime
scene evidence for profit. It has also ignited an arms race that threatens to undermine security in the region
for decades to come.
­ International Cooperation : Given the multi­jurisdictional nature of poaching and wildlife trafficking
syndicates and the costs involved in tackling their cross­border networks, law enforcement agencies
urgently need to pool resources and strengthen international partnerships.
­ National Loopholes: The export, sale, and possession of recreational weapons—including hunting rifles
and associated ammunition—tend to be lightly regulated compared to other types of firearms. Given how
organized crime and terrorist­affiliated networks are increasingly using hunting rifles and associated
ammunition, it is urgent that policymakers in impacted countries and regions closely examine gaps in export
laws, end­user controls, licensing regimes, government inspection activities, and weapon destruction
programs pertaining to hunting and other forms of recreational weapons.
­ Action Required: Arms manufacturers, legal arms dealers, the professional hunting community, and
governments must take concrete steps to halt the flow of firearms used to slaughter rhinos, elephants, lions,
and other wildlife species in southern Africa. Stifling the influx of firearms will have the added value of
curtailing the expansion of transnational organized crime and drying up sources of financing for criminal
enterprises, terrorist groups, and rogue regimes. Public outcry can help draw attention to the Rhino Rifle
Syndicate gunrunning investigation and ensure there is adequate political will in 2019 to disrupt the gun
supply chains.

[Lisbeth]

The "Follow-the-guns" theory is not new. I think that read about it for the first time at least two years ago. It is incredible that nothing has been done about it yet

This could explain it: Corruption: High­level corruption and political influence peddling have fueled the proliferation of CZ rifles
in Mozambique and South Africa. Government and law enforcement inaction against the gunrunning
networks is an indicator of corruption in South Africa and Mozambique. but they cannot all be corrupt....or can they
Or maybe the usual indifference: "Somebody else will do something, not my business".

[Klipspringer]

One should really read the entire report!


Some serious accusations there

Save for allowing us to work with ECIs, Kruger largely continued its strategy of catching or killing low­level
poaching teams, a move that was not altogether surprising. The park was plagued with corruption and had a
vested interest in keeping the rhino war going. International donors had poured tens of millions of dollars
into Kruger since the crisis began, a money stream that would likely evaporate if the park won the war and
hostilities ground to a halt. South Africa had elevated rhino poaching to a National Priority Crime in 2014,
and Kruger officials had repeatedly emphasized publicly how they were doing everything within their power
to combat the problem, but the rejection of gun traces defied that rhetoric, raising serious questions about
the park’s commitment to ending rhino poaching once and for all.
Kruger’s decision to carry on business as usual ultimately proved disastrous. The subsequent influx of new
CZ rifles allowed the TCO to form bigger poaching teams and launch coordinated operations over an
ever­widening geographical area. In the first eight months of 2016, the number of illegal incursions into
Kruger shot up more than 27%—to a staggering 2,115—over the same period one year prior. The
poaching corps operating in Kruger became one of the fastest­growing in the world, and it would have to be
reckoned with for years to come as it expanded throughout the region and started killing not only increasing
numbers of rhinos but also more elephants, lions, pangolins and other forms of wildlife.

[Klipspringer]

9.1 Gaza Province In Mozambique Attracts TCO
In the early 2000s, Kruger merged with Limpopo National Park in Mozambique and the Gonarezhou
National Park in Zimbabwe to form one large conservation area named the Great Limpopo Transfrontier
Park (Great Limpopo Park).

Most of the Mozambican portion of Great Limpopo Park lies within Gaza Province and is still referred to as
Limpopo National Park (Limpopo Park). The conservation area was originally devised as part of a laudable
long­term goal aimed at expanding animal migratory routes, reinvigorating wildlife habitat, and spurring
tourism. But as officials put the plan into action, entire communities were displaced from their ancestral,
agricultural, grazing, and traditional hunting lands. As many as 30,000 local Mozambicans—mostly in
Gaza—were ultimately affected by this change.

The TCO exploited the local grievances that naturally emerged as a result, seizing on Gazans’ sense of
economic marginalization to transform the province into the nerve center of its gun distribution network.
Gaza was a prime location, as its entire eastern border abutted Kruger, giving the TCO a base from which it
could easily launch poaching operations in the park. The TCO, including corrupt Mozambican elites,
offered Gazans cash in exchange for joining its ranks, and in so doing, began to build a rhino poaching
apparatus unlike anything seen in the 21st century.

Making matters worse, the open­fence agreement that accompanied the formation of Great Limpopo Park
allowed rhinos to freely migrate from Kruger into the Gaza section of the new conservation area. Once in
Gaza, the rhinos proved easy pickings for the TCO’s fledgling poaching corps. The few police and game
rangers not in on the take lacked the training to deal with the potent criminal network. Nearly all of the rhinos
that migrated from Kruger were killed once they crossed into Mozambique, yet their losses were often not
included in South Africa’s rhino death statistics, obscuring Kruger’s mortality rates.

To ensure Great Limpopo Park’s success, two new border posts at Giriyondo and Parfuri became
operational. These posts were set up to accommodate visitors traveling between Kruger Park on the South
African side and Limpopo Park on the Mozambican side. Both Kruger and Mozambican police records show
that corruption and lackluster policing allowed these border posts to become a “super highway” for the
cross­border movement of poaching bosses and operations. One of the top Mozambican poaching
bosses, Justice “Nympini” Ngoveni, acquired enough construction materials to build a hotel with more than
two dozen rooms by funneling rhino horn profits through the Giriyondo border post into the South African
town of Phalaborwa, often with the knowledge of South African police and park officials.

Before the migrating rhinos were all but wiped out in Limpopo Park, a second wildlife reserve was
established to the immediate south. This new wildlife reserve—called the Greater Lebombo Conservancy
(Greater Lebombo)—consisted mostly of private hunting concessions. Much like Limpopo Park, Greater
Lebombo Conservancy was bolstered by allowing gaps in the fences to clear the way for migratory wildlife,
and it wasn’t long before Kruger’s rhinos moved in. The Greater Lebombo Conservancy was marketed as
a transboundary security buffer. Instead, it became a hotbed of poaching as dodgy concession
stakeholders, corrupt concession staff, and poaching networks conspired to avail themselves of the killing
field at their doorstep. Mr. Numaio, the Stoltzs, Dolf Kampman, some of their business associates, and
other Mozambican elites such as Mr. Bila were among them.

By 2013, Mozambique’s rhino population had dropped from around 300 to less than a dozen. The horn
acquired simultaneously from poaching in Mozambique and pseudo­hunts in South Africa enabled the TCO
to drive up Asian market demand through the use of sophisticated marketing strategies. It would take
another 10 years and 7,000 more rhino deaths across southern Africa before demand reduction initiatives in
Asia began to counteract this new criminally­contrived market trend

[Klipspringer]

In March 2014, high­level South African and Mozambican officials—including Kruger’s ECI chief and the
head of Mozambican police investigations—discussed the specific need to ascertain the provenance of the
rifles recovered from rhino poaching crime scenes. Kruger said that the origin of poachers’ guns was a top
concern for South Africa. Kruger also said that in December 2013, it had commenced an investigation into
the problem, which pointed to the involvement of manufacturers in the Czech Republic, the U.S., and
Germany. But when we arrived in late 2014, the investigations appeared to have already ground to a
halt, with anti­poaching forces telling us that Kruger had done next to nothing against the gunrunners or their
suppliers.

Kruger’s apathy came into sharper relief as we visited police vaults at the park and in nearby towns and
found hundreds of recovered poaching rifles sitting idly in plastic bags. The South African police should have
been processing these rifles for evidence and documenting their markings and physical characteristics. But
evidence suggests that officers were instead stealing the rifles out of the vaults and placing them back into
poachers’ hands. We found one rifle that appeared to have been recovered by South African authorities on
three separate occasions. This is either a reflection of shoddy recordkeeping practices or criminal behavior
on the part of police.

[Klipspringer]

12.2 Inaction Allows TCO To Expand
The collective failure of Czech, Mozambican, and South African authorities to address the gun supply
chains—despite the evidence provided in 2015 and 2016—enabled the TCO to continue its expansion.

Not long after we handed over dossiers to those countries, the TCO stopped using Investcon to buy rifles,
undoubtedly aware that it was now compromised. Instead, it began relying on a broader network of
intermediaries that included both private Mozambican citizens as well as local police officers acting in their
personal capacity. We traced freshly recovered poaching rifles in South Africa to these individuals in the
same way we had previously traced Investcon’s crime guns. But the broader array of suspects—and their
locations across multiple districts—presented new and formidable resource and jurisdictional challenges to
Mozambican and South African police.

By diversifying its rifle distribution channels beyond Investcon, the TCO weakened its command and control
over the guns. We spoke to recent poachers­turned­bosses who had paid for new CZ rifles and recruits
using their own profits from the horns. As a result, both the number of poaching bosses and the number
of poachers increased exponentially.

The enlistment of new personnel enabled the TCO to spread its distribution network across a broader
geographical area. Using CZ rifles from the Portugal shipment we had failed to halt, the TCO expanded
southward, bearing down on South Africa’s second largest source of rhinos: KwaZulu Natal Province. This
southward expansion within South Africa also precipitated the corresponding establishment of a new gun
and horn trafficking hub among border communities in the area of Mozambique’s far southern boundary.
Local elders and community members there told us the rifles distributed from this new hub were used to
target South Africa’s Ndumo Game Reserve and Tembe Elephant Park as well as other rhino hot spots in
KwaZulu Natal.

In addition to enabling the TCO’s expansion, the CZ rifles helped nefarious private anti­poaching forces bilk
international donors. In June 2016, the Hawks anti­corruption unit asked us to analyze a small sample of
.375­ and .458­caliber CZ rifles recovered from rhino poaching crime scenes in KwaZulu Natal Province.
The Hawks believed the rifles may have been planted at crime scenes by a private anti­poaching unit trying
to secure more funding by boosting its arrest numbers. This unit is alleged to have killed people whom it
claimed were poachers, but whom law enforcement believed were innocents lured into a death trap. Our
analysis for the Hawks produced a 100% match—each rifle on the list was part of the October 2015
shipment that South African authorities had refused to halt in Portugal. While the issue of anti­poaching
forces profiting off false arrests and extrajudicial killings requires greater research, the serious human rights
concerns it raises should not be overlooked.

[Klipspringer]

13.4 Cautionary Note ­ Problematic Developments in 2019
In February and March 2019, we returned to key poaching villages and towns in Mozambique. We
witnessed poaching bosses in and around Massingir planning for the forthcoming visit of a high­level
delegation from Maputo. Confirmed by both Maputo officials and local leaders, the delegation was expected
to include deputy attorney general Albino Macamo, among others. We also witnessed Kruger staff
participating in the planning meetings alongside the poaching bosses. We were told that South African
authorities might also accompany the Maputo delegation.

The stated objective of the official delegation to Massingir was to reach an agreement—referred to locally as
the “Massingir Declaration”—whereby the Massingir community would cease poaching activities in
exchange for amnesty. Every official we spoke to said the agreement would not require Massingir to
surrender its firearms and ammunition; nor would it subject poaching bosses and other kingpins to arrest.
Based on our interviews and observations, those behind the agreement appeared to be intent on weakening
law enforcement and stifling government initiatives aimed at holding the TCO, corrupt officials, ruling party
elites, and poaching bosses accountable. These entities have engaged and continue to engage in criminal
activity including mass­scale rhino poaching, illegal trafficking and possession of guns, cross­border
offenses, corruption and bribery, and murder and other violent acts. The culprits should be prosecuted for
these crimes, not granted amnesty

[Klipspringer]

16. Country­ Specific Recommendations

16.6 To South Africa:

❖ Conduct a comprehensive investigation into the criminal activities of South African and foreign entities
linked to the Rhino Rifle Syndicate and prosecute those falling under South Africa’s jurisdiction as
warranted.
❖ Strengthen record keeping, storage, and control requirements to prevent corrupt authorities from
diverting government­owned or government­seized firearms to poaching networks;
❖ Ensure the timely destruction of seized crime guns;
❖ Provide support to other jurisdictions investigating the Rhino Rifle Syndicate and the illegal gun supply
chains aiding and abetting wildlife TCOs.

16.7 To South Africa Parliament:
❖ Launch an inquiry into the failures of the South African government, and SANParks in particular, to
address the proliferation of CZ hunting rifles during early stages of the country’s rhino crisis.

[Richprins]

Klippies.

Yes, the guns were originally via Portugal, I think? Now direct from Czech Rep.

I can confirm that guns go back into circulation from police, but mostly on the Moz side. The lady who did this report is persona non grata at SANParks, big time...

[Flutterby]

Very interesting.