Kruger History-Worst Train Accident rembered

[RogerFraser]

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Robert Elliott
Fifty three years ago today (1/1/1968) the worst train accident in Kruger Park history happened. In 1968 the railway line ran through the park and would only later be diverted outside the park boundaries. Train 1565 consisted of five goods wagons, four passenger saloons, and a guards van. While travelling through the park the train developed trouble with the train's vacuum system which resulted in the train being brought to an automatic stop. About ten minutes later goods train 1509 smashed into the back of the stationery train having failed to stop in time. The driver of train 1509 was killed together with 12 passengers in train 1565. A further 51 people were injured (2 railway employees and 49 passengers). It was later ascertained that the good train was speeding and, as such, was unable to stop before smashing into the train 1565 at around 70 kph.

Andrew Van Ginkel

Robert Elliott adding to your post about the train accident...
Railways Africa - February 1999
Wally Brass relates what happened on New Year’s day in 1968 when two trains collided on the old line through the Kruger National Park. To complicate matters staff that rushed to the rescue had to be protected against wild animals by park wardens.
Mixed train No 1565 left Randspruit Station on 1 January 1968 at 13h49 (error probably 12h49), on time. The train consisted of five goods wagons, four passenger saloons and a guards van. The load was 626 tonnes for 48 axles. The train was hauled by diesel locomotive No 32-108. In the cab were the driver, his assistant and another driver travelling spare after having booked off at Newington station earlier in the day.
The driver of the locomotive applied his brakes shortly after leaving Randspruit because he was travelling down a grade of 1 in 67 through a series of curves. The permanent speed restriction over this section had recently been reduced from 56km/h to 48km/h because of the condition of the track.
The driver had just come out of the downgrade onto a level portion of the track and into a curve to the left when he lost vacuum. Train brakes came on automatically bringing the train to a halt. It was 13h01.
The driver suspected that one of the vacuum coupling pipes had come loose, so he asked his assistant to walk back along the train to make sure.
When the train came to a halt, the tranship porter travelling with the train was told by some of the passengers that two coupling pipes between the first and second passenger saloons had fallen off. He trotted back along the track until he found them a short distance behind the train.
On his way back to the train he passed the guard going to protect the train at the rear.
Train control was by means of the Van Schoor train control system, absolute permissive and intermediate working. Protection was required.
The porter met the driver’s assistant at the point where the pipes had to be recoupled and agreed that he would do the work. He was just about to start when he heard the noise of a train approaching. He looked back to see a goods train bearing down on the stationary train at some speed.
He threw the coupling pipes to one side and jumped clear.
The guard had walked back to provide protection at the rear of his train. He placed detonators on the rails at 430m and 520m from the rear of his train. He had passed the porter returning with two coupling pipes so he knew what the problem was.
He was standing clear of the track showing a red flag when he heard the sound of a train approaching. The train passed him at high speed, the driver applying breaks fully after he had exploded the detonators.
The driver of train No 1565 was looking back watching his assistant returning to the locomotive when he saw the goods train hurtling towards his train. It was clear that a collision was inevitable. He tried to put his train in motion but the automatic brakes precluded that.
Goods train No 1509 smashed into the back of the stationary mixed train No 1565 at 13h12.
The collision forced the guards van and all four passenger saloons of train No 1565 to derail, overturn and roll down a three-metre high bank. Six goods wagons and both diesel locomotives of train No 1509 were derailed.
The leading diesel locomotive of train No 1509 and the guards van and the four wooden passenger saloons of train No 1565 were completely wrecked.
The driver of train 1509 and 12 passengers in train 1565 lost their lives. Two other railway personnel and 49 passengers were injured.
Reporting the accident
The driver of train No 1565 jumped out of his locomotive and ran back to see what had happened. Chaos met his eyes. He reckoned there was not much he could do so he decided the best course of action was to go and get help.
He went back to his locomotive. He and the spare driver examined it as best they could. It seemed all right so he decided to go to the next interloop in it. He uncoupled the locomotive and drove it to Bume, the next interloop, accompanied by the spare driver. He had given his assistant orders to protect the rest of the train in the front.
At Bume he contacted the station foreman at Komatipoort and reported the accident at 13h50.
He refused to travel further in the locomotive until a diesel fitter had examined it and declared it roadworthy. He was still in possession of the permissive tablet. Pilot working could not be introduced until this tablet had been cancelled at Komatipoort.
Arrangements were made to get a diesel fitter to Bume as soon as possible.
There were two guards travelling in the guards van of train No 1509. One was spare and it was agreed that he would provide protection at the rear of this train while the guard working the train walked back to Randspruit station to report the accident.
On the way he was picked up in a car by a signal technician who happened to be passing. The guard reported the accident at 13h40. Unfortunately he didn’t know the details so it wasn’t until the driver reported from Bume that the extent of the accident was known.
Clearing the site
Once the seriousness of the accident was known, doctors, ambulances, railway personnel, police and breakdown teams were called out at 14h20.
A doctor from Komatipoort arrived on-site at 14h45. He would have been earlier but he lost his way. The injured were conveyed by ambulances and departmental vehicles to nearby hospitals.
The Nelspruit breakdown team was the first on-site at 18h00. Although the breakdown train at Komatipoort was ready to depart by 15h08, they were delayed because pilot working had not been introduced.
The stationmaster from Komatipoort sized up the situation. The driver of the diesel locomotive standing at Bume stil held the permissive tablet.
The stationmaster decided to go to Bume to withdraw the tablet so that pilot working could be introduced. He went in a car with the hysterical pregnant wife of the driver who had travelled spare on the locomotive. He got lost and took some time to get to Bume.
The diesel fitter arrived soon after. He examined the locomotive throughly and declared it roadworthy.
The stationmaster realised that he had an opportunity at that time. Here was a locomotive in section still in possession of a valid tablet. He decided to go to the site of the accident. There he assessed the situation and arranged for the portion of train No 1565, which had not derailed, to be recoupled to the locomotive and cleared to Komatipoort.
In the meantime, the breakdown train from Waterval Boven had arrived at Komatipoort. When pilot working was introduced it was decided to combine the Komatipoort and Waterval Boven trains and send them into the section as one train. As a consequence, this breakdown train only arrived at 23h42.
The perway personnel were on the scene by 15h25. The teams helped wherever possible until they could rebuild the damaged track. After the blockage had been cleared and the track rebuilt, the line was reopened to traffic at 19h20 on 2 January 1968.
Arrangements were made to transfer un-injured passengers from the site by bus to Komatipoort.
Mailbags which were being carried in the guard's van of the train No 1565 were removed by the tranship porter. He guarded them until he and the bags were taken by road to Komatipoort.
Police collected personal belongings and held them in safe custody until they were claimed.
Protection of the accident
There was some confusion about the protection at the site, before and after the accident.
The guard of the leading train No 1565 maintained that he was standing at the point where he had placed detonators on the rails showing a red flag when train no 1509 raced past him.
Witnesses placed him halfway between that point and his train, walking back towards the train. Under cross-examination, he admitted he was walking back, but that he was carrying the two vacuum pipes that had fallen off. This was discounted by the tranship porter and the driver’s assistant. It was obvious that the guard had left the point of protection, which constituted a misdemeanour.
The guard of train No 1509 who went to report the accident at Randspruit returned to take over protection from the spare guard.
When perway personnel provided protection of the track, the guard left his point of protection, which was contrary to extant instructions. He should have remained there to protect his train.
The accident happened about thirty kilometres from Komatipoort in the Kruger National Park. A game ranger who had been on routine inspection came across the accident shortly after it had happened. He immediately arranged for Park personnel to protect the workers from wild animals for the full period the site was being cleared.
Special Operating Instructions
Because the railway line passed through the Kruger National Park, and danger from wild animals was ever-present, special operating instructions were in force at that time.
* A minimum interval between trains of 30 minutes during the day and sixty minutes at night was required in both directions when all interloops were open for operating purposes unless absolute working could be used.
* If an interloop was closed, then an interval of 120 minutes was required over the lengthened section.
* It was not necessary for a guard to provide protection at night if his train stopped in a section not protected by fixed signals.
Train No 1565 left Randspruit at 12h49. The accident occurred at 13h12. Following train No 1509 could not possibly have observed the 30-minute interval required between trains. It should only have left Randspruit at 13h19.
The guard and driver of train No. 1509 received a permissive tablet with a T 389 written warning that train No 1565 was ahead and had left the station at 12h49. The guard had no watch. His official watch was broken and had been handed in for repair. He maintained that the station foreman at Randspruit had given him the hand signal to depart and entered the time as 13h19 in his train journal.
The station foreman denied giving the guard right of way. He was busy at the facing points setting them for train No 1566 to depart in the opposite direction. This train departed at 13h05 as recorded in the train journal and the train register at the station. When he returned to the station building the station foreman noted that train No 1509 had departed. He then went for lunch. When he returned he entered the time of departure as 13h19 in his train register. He admitted that he didn’t really know what time the train had departed but assumed the 30-minute interval had been observed.
The guard and ticket examiner of train No 1566 independently confirmed that train No 1509 was already moving when their train departed. They said that the driver had sounded his locomotive whistle and the guard of train No 1509 immediately gave the right of way.
The board of enquiry concluded that train No 1509 departed at 13h05, 16 minutes after train No 1565.
Speed of train No 1509
The accident occurred at 13h12. Goods train No 1509 left Randspruit at 13h05. Running time to the site of the accident was seven minutes. The distance was eight kilometres. This gave an average speed of more than 68km/h. Maximum allowable speed was 48km/h.
A dynamometer test done in 1966 with a train of similar load to train No 1509 was used to establish certain criteria. Train No 1509 was carrying a load of 1424 tonne for 92 axles and was hauled by two diesel locomotives No 32-088 (in front) and 32-097.
The first 2,5km from the station was fairly level and the remainder to the accident downgrade. The test indicated travelling time of about seven minutes which could only have been achieved at an average speed of 70km/h or higher.
Theoretical calculations using a train the same load as train No 1509 travelling at 70km/h were carried out. Assuming that full breaks were applied only when the detonators were set off, it was concluded that at the point of collision the speed would have had to be between 65 and 70km/h.
Even if the driver had been observing the speed limit, and had been in control of his train, the speed at collision would have been between 35 and 45km/h.
The protection behind train No 1565 was not according to trains working regulations. Even if it had been, and train No 1565 was under control and travelling at the correct speed, the stopping distance would have been inadequate and an accident could not have n=been avoided.
The board settled on a speed in excess of 65km/h at point of collision.
Irregularities
The board identified several irregularities.
The driver of following train No 1509 -
* gave his driver the right of way without getting a “train may depart” signal from the station foreman
* exceeded the maximum speed limit of 48km/h.
The guard of leading train No 1565 -
* did not record the time that his train had stopped in section
* did not provide protection in accordance with trains working regulations
* left the point of protection
The station foreman at Randspruit -
* did not try stop train No 1509 from leaving early
* entered the time of departure of train No 1509 in his train register as 13h19 knowing full well that the train had departed earlier
* went for lunch when a goods train was standing in his station ready to depart
The guard of following train No 1509 -
* gave his driver the right of way with out getting a “train may depart” signal from the station foreman
* never looked back to see if a danger signal was being displayed before giving the second right-away signal.
* did not react in terms of trains working regulations when it became apparent that the train was travelling faster than the allowable speed
* entered the incorrect time of departure in his train journal
The driver of leading train No 1565 -
* didn’t make sure that his assistant had replaced the vacuum pipes that had fallen off
* allowed a spare driver to travel on his footplate, which was contrary to instructions.
The spare driver -
* travelled on the footplate of the locomotive of train No 1565 knowing full well that it was not allowed
Disciplinary action was taken against all personnel concerned.
Comments
There was no mention made of the fact that the driver was known to be a “cowboy”. He often travelled faster than allowed.
A Parks Board official testified that he had often raced against trains in his van. The road ran parallel to the railway line at times and he had to travel extremely fast to beat the train. Obviously, some of the drivers were wont to travel fast.
New Year’s Day was a public holiday; a dance had been planned in Komatipoort that night.
It is possible that the driver and guard of following train No 1509 were in a hurry to get home to prepare for the dance. They took a chance and left Randspruit earlier than allowed.
The driver had travelled over this section at speeds in excess of that allowable without mishap. He left Randspruit 48 minutes ahead of the scheduled time. This indicated that he had made up a lot of time.
He probably never even thought that the train ahead would stop in section.
When he set off the detonators he should have been in a position to see the train ahead. Although he tried to slow down his momentum was too great.
Evidence was that he could never have avoided the accident, but the severity of the collision would have been far less if he had travelled at the laid down speed.
He took chances, but this time they didn’t pay off.

[Richprins]