To trade or not to trade: the rhino horn question
Learn what the debate around the legalised sale of rhino horn is all about.
Susanna Oosthuizen | 23 May 2014 10:30
Will the once-off sale of South Africa’s estimated 18 tons of stockpiled rhino horn lead to a decrease in poaching? This, along with the possible consequences of a trade ban lift, were among the most pertinent questions posed at the ‘Risk Assessment of Rhino Horn Trade’ conference held in Onderstepoort in April. Organised by the local non-profit organisation, Outraged Citizens Against Poaching (OSCAP), it included several international conservation agencies as well as an impressive array of international key note speakers.
The conference followed on the announcement in 2013 by the minister of environmental affairs, Edna Molewa, that the country would back ”the establishment of a well regulated international trade” in rhino horn and seek permission from CITES (Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora) in 2016 for a one-off sale of stockpiles worth around $1 billion.” International trade in rhino horn has been banned since 1976.
The ongoing debate has been conducted on international and local levels for several months and across many platforms, with a focus on several key factors:
- Market factors:
So-called “pro-traders” believe that releasing tons (estimated to be between 18 and 20) of stockpiled horn into the market will increase supply in consumer countries to such a degree that it will bring the price down. With legal horn selling at a lower price, consumers will be “hi-jacked” from illegal markets. In turn, lower prices will reduce incentive to poach.
Opponents of trade, like Mary Rice of the Environmental Investigation Agency, Suzy Watts (Humane Society International) and Will Travers (Born Free Foundation), however, told conference delegates that these viewpoints were seriously flawed. Not enough is known, they explained, about the rhino horn market to prove the above assumptions, and that that the real market size and characteristics are still unknown factors. “Think about it, there is no incentive for Asian traders to keep the price low at the user end. South Africa will only be able to control the price at which it sells the horn,” said Travers. The market price would therefore not necessarily drop in countries like China and Vietnam. “Poaching may always be cheaper than farming,” Watts warned. Many also believe that legalising the use of rhino horn in Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM) could enlarge the market considerably. Calculations presented at OSCAP by Dex Kotze showed that if 1% of the population of all consumer countries used the generally prescribed dosages, 15 tons would be required per annum. This increases to 327 tons for use by 5% of the population.
- The reaction of organized crime syndicates:
Even in well regulated markets, laundering occurs and pro-traders are naïve to think rhino horn trade will be any different. This was the general view expressed at OSCAP. Organised crime syndicates will not necessarily passively stand by and accept a lower price. Illegally obtained horn could find its way into the legal market and smugglers could try to sell more to make up for their losses. In addition, there is a risk that syndicates could create new, niche markets for horn products.
A real fear among conservationists relates to the fact that Chinese consumers currently pay considerably more for “wild” bear bile and tiger bone compared to the “farmed” alternative.
-The stigma effect:
Legalising trade could remove the stigma attached to consumption and open up the market, rather than reduce it, trade challengers suggested.
- Rhino horn farming and the cost of security:
Perhaps one of the best known pro-traders, private rhino owner John Hume, has stated on several occasions that “rhino farms” can create jobs and alleviate poverty. “With a legal trade, rhino farming will create more habitats for rhino, as well as other threatened species.” He also states that emergent black farmers and rural communities can be assisted and taught to farm rhino, leading to community-based wildlife management.
The argument against this is that regulation and its associated cost will exclude the poor. In addition, government assistance for emerging farmers in South Africa has traditionally been unsuccessful. Corruption and collusion in the industry could create an opportunity for unethical farmers to side-line a complicated and costly permit system by using illegal channels to move legally farmed horn.
- Successes and failures of other trade bans:
The trade ban on ivory has not stopped the large scale poaching of elephant. This is an argument often used by pro-traders. The success story of the South American Vicuna is also often touted by this faction as an example of how sustainable farming has saved a species from extinction. Furthermore, they argue, the current rhino trade ban has also not done much to stop poaching. An analysis of the rhino horn market suggests to pro traders that it shares similar demand characteristics to alcohol and illegal drugs. Bans on such products are unenforceable – they simply result in much higher prices and ensure that all trade is handled by crime syndicates.
Not so, the OSCAP speakers countered the above, generally held beliefs. Bans on rhino horn trade in “old” consumer countries like Japan and Taiwan effectively killed the demand for it. Several speakers added that a ban isn’t effective without the political drive to arrest and prosecute syndicates involved in the illegal trade. Peter Knights of the WildAid organization explained to delegates how a total ban on trade and use, coupled with extensive awareness campaigns, had reduced the price of shark fin in Indonesia with up to 80%, making it unviable to kill these animals. Two stockpile sales of ivory in 2008 and 2009 actually increased the demand and fuelled elephant poaching , suggested expert Dr Paula Kahumbu from Kenya. She stressed that it had been proven in Kenya that the legal trade only provided an avenue for laundering funds generated through the parallel illicit trade.