Africa Wild

Abstract
This report illustrates attitudes garnered from nine focus groups in several poaching communities in and around South African and Mozambican game parks, and approximately 15 in-depth interviews with experts working in the parks. Although the communities exhibited differences, there also exist a common set of conditions in them: economically marginalized populations, anger toward the status quo, huge financial incentives from poaching, widespread corruption, and porous borders, all of which highlight the complex interaction of economic and political factors in perpetuating illicit wildlife trafficking. Until conservation and anti-poaching and trafficking efforts are ramped up, demand is reduced in Asian countries such as Viet Nam, and communities nearest the parks see it in their interest to protect endangered animals such as the rhino, gaining greater traction through efforts to bring an end to poaching will be difficult.

Executive Summary
This report examines the key drivers of rhino poaching—which illustrate the complex interaction of economic and political factors—as highlighted in focus group discussions in poaching communities and interviews with park rangers and other experts around parks in South Africa and Mozambique. Several drivers for poaching came out of this research, each of which is discussed in the report and summarized briefly here.
The Limpopo National Park and Kruger National Park belong to the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park that straddles South Africa, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe. Transfrontier parks were created to allow ecosystems to flow undisturbed across international borders, but with this also comes the uncontrolled movement of humans through Porous Borders. While Kruger has funding to monitor those entering for tourism at official access points, rangers in Limpopo claim they can’t distinguish between Mozambicans who live in Limpopo park and others who are simply passing through. This makes it easy for poachers to cross national borders undetected. This section also delves into the nuances of How Poaching Occurs.
Anger and Marginalization within the communities toward the parks is a salient issue. Community members identify very little in the way of employment, profit or opportunity trickling down to them from official park services. A lack of perceived opportunities has translated into anger toward park officials and, for some, a desire to protect illegal hunters: “we know the poachers, but because the park doesn’t want to help us, we don’t want to help [the park].” Many participants claim park animals kill
their cattle, and the parks offer little to no compensation. They also have little faith in negotiations with conservation authorities because of weak follow-through on park promises to scale up community development. Yet some still see killing the animals as morally wrong. Park managers claim that locals are less likely to enforce the law if given employment because they are more easily corruptible and more vulnerable to pressure from poachers. While community development and education occurs in the way of boreholes, wildlife education in schools, and job creation for neighboring communities, programs seem to fluctuate greatly from community to community, making it difficult to instill the belief that the parks are beneficial for all.
Economic Incentives lure many youth into poaching. Locally available jobs like farming, animal husbandry, selling charcoal, or irregular work in neighboring cities simply cannot compare with “the gold in the horn.” Some participants see the poachers “as role models,” and argue they “do good things for the community” and facilitate job creation when they spend their wealth locally. The income can be used for “sending children to school, nice houses, and expensive cars and clothes.” Survival in 3 economically depressed communities thus takes precedence over wildlife conservation, and the debate ensues between poaching for daily subsistence versus for greed. For young people particularly, there is substantial peer pressure to compete with friends for the status that comes from having a disposable income to buy new things. Embarking on an adventure to kill a rhino becomes more attractive than remaining idle in a community with few economic alternatives.
Efforts to introduce counter-incentives have found limited success. While tipoff hotlines exist, some say they are unlikely to take advantage of these programs. To some extent, this is because there is limited awareness of them, but more compellingly, community members Fear retribution, as well as exhibit other types of fear. In some communities, poaching remains secretive even among acquaintances: a hunter with a horn is in danger of being robbed and killed before he can get his prize to the traffickers.
Finally, Political Will and Corruption play their part. While both countries now have official policies in place against poaching and trafficking, experts say implementation is fraught with complications because of corruption on multiple levels. Both rangers and community members claim crooked police officials peddle (and recycle) arms. Community members also acknowledge dishonest rangers disclose rhino locations to poachers, and some say the problem will only end when “corrupt officials at the top” are brought to justice. Few prosecutions have occurred in comparison to the ideal and those who are convicted often pay minimal fines and do little, if any, jail time. Several participants note that after only a few months “you see that person back on the street.” This section examines attitudes, and also provides a current overview of recent agreements, partnerships, and evolution in laws in the two countries.
The report then examines Solutions from community and expert perspectives. In discussing steps to improve the situation, community members and park rangers tend to focus on three ideas. (1) The need for more local community programming to draw community buy-in to the mission of the parks and goals of conservation. One step in the right direction seems to be the appointment of Rhino Ambassadors, or community members who serve as liaisons between the parks and communities. But in an environment of tight budgets, governments have tended to prioritize security measures over community development and education programs. (2) Enforcing laws already on the books to deter the police and high-level politicians that rangers and community members repeatedly stated they believe are involved in trafficking. (3) There needs to be increased technical capacity for enforcement that includes basic logistics—vehicles for Limpopo’s rangers who are often on foot, and more advanced surveillance equipment to keep up with increasingly sophisticated poaching techniques. Rangers and some community members note that certain areas are well known for detecting and catching poachers, which deters criminals from entering these locales. Conservation experts agree it is possible to decrease poaching, but it requires resources “now, not tomorrow.” In the words of one ranger who has worked in conservation for over 25 years: “once the human eye detects a change in nature, it’s too late.”
The Conclusion offers a brief discussion of short-term versus long-term vision in regards to risky behavior and offers follow-ups for future research in communities. Appendix A offers a more in-depth overview of the pros and cons of each of the communities, as highlighted by those involved in this research.